Digital accountability becomes digital vigilantism when the crowd stops demanding that institutions act and starts delivering the punishment itself.
The test is not whether the accused turns out to be guilty. It is whether the process respects the person’s right to be heard, to be presumed innocent, and to recover once the facts are known.
Two truths the internet forces us to hold
Social media has given silence-breakers a platform. When Priya Ramani named M.J. Akbar online during #MeToo, the legal system answered her with a criminal defamation complaint. In 2021, a Delhi court acquitted her, holding that the right to reputation cannot be protected at the cost of a woman’s right to dignity, and that she could raise her grievance on any platform, even after decades. That judgment shows why online accusation is sometimes the only accountability available. Institutions had failed these women for years, and the internet gave them a hearing.
The same tools also produce the opposite result. Daniel Trottier’s work on digital vigilantism describes citizens who are collectively offended by another person’s conduct and coordinate retaliation on social platforms. The resulting visibility is unwanted, intense and enduring: content reaches millions within days and can remain the top search result for the target .The accused is tried, sentenced and publicly shamed before any court has examined a single piece of evidence.
Both realities are real. A rule that treats every viral accusation as vigilantism silences survivors, and a rule that treats every viral accusation as accountability abandons the presumption of innocence.
What the law already tells us
Indian law has long held that publicity makes for tarnished justice. The Supreme Court, in Sahara India Real Estate Corp. v. SEBI, said that the right to fair trial as guaranteed under Article 21 should be harmonized with the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). It allowed litigants to seek postponement of the publication of prejudicial material, subject to the criteria of a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial and necessity and proportionality . The twentieth-century Law Commission Report on trial by media came to a similar conclusion, noting that the presumption of innocence of a suspect until proven guilty in court is a fundamental right.
Even reputation is constitutionally guaranteed. In Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, the Court decided that the right to reputation is a part of the right to life as guaranteed by Article 21 and upheld criminal defamation as a reasonable restriction on speech. The same judgment has drawn criticism, because criminal defamation is now often used to settle scores. Reputation deserves protection, but the stronger remedies should not be turned against people who speak.
The speech side is equally well settled. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India struck down Section 66A because it blurred the line between mere discussion or advocacy, however unpopular, and incitement, and only incitement can be restricted. An angry post, a harsh opinion or an accusation made in good faith is therefore protected speech. Courts have also begun to recognize that stigma can outlive the proceedings. The Delhi High Court gave interim protection to a man acquitted in an NDPS case, asking search platforms to de-index material about the case, and balanced his Article 21 privacy against the public’s right to information.
A workable test: three questions
The case law gives us the pieces, but not a single test for the internet era. I propose three questions to separate accountability from vigilantism.
- What is the crowd asking for? Accountability directs the allegation toward a forum: a police complaint, an internal committee, a court, a regulator. Vigilantism treats the post itself as the verdict, with demands to “cancel”, “expose” or “destroy” the person. Ramani’s disclosures were framed as testimony. A mob demanding that a stranger be fired before any inquiry is demanding a sentence.
- How is the allegation made and spread? Responsible accountability is a communication that both conveys what the communicator knows, separates allegation from fact and remains open to correction. Vigilantism goes beyond doxxing and publishing home addresses and employers; it involves recruiting others to harass. Trottier has described exactly this “naming and shaming” process in which the target’s address and place of work were made public, and online and offline harassment followed. Once it turns into incitement or harassment, it is not protected by Shreya Singhal precedent.
- What happens once the facts are known? The internet does not ask this question. A sentence imposed by a court ends when it expires. Viral trials have no expiry date or deadline. When the accused is acquitted, or the allegation fails, the original accusers and the platforms do not usually change the record. Accountability stays correctable. Vigilantism gives no room for repentance.
Why “just trust the courts” is not an answer
Critics of viral accusations often retreat to the position that people should simply wait for the courts. That ignores why many people go online in the first place. Courts are slow, and survivors of workplace harassment have historically been disbelieved or sued. The Ramani verdict itself acknowledged that sexual harassment typically happens behind closed doors . A legal order that tells complainants to wait quietly, and then punishes them for speaking, produces the vigilantism it condemns.
The opposite retreat, the claim that the internet is simply the new public square and that shaming is free speech, ignores that a mob has no burden of proof, no right of reply and no proportionality. The Supreme Court has said that even the press can be restrained when a real and substantial risk to a fair trial exists . Anonymous crowds cannot be held to a lesser standard than a newspaper.
What reform should look like
- First, regulate conduct rather than opinion. Doxing, coordinated harassment and threats should be dealt with quickly under existing law, without reviving vague speech offences such as Section 66A kind that the Court rightly struck down.
- Second, platforms should have notice-and-correction duties, so that an acquittal, a withdrawn complaint or a court finding can be attached to viral content and the target can seek de-indexing in appropriate cases, as the Delhi High Court has begun to allow.
- Third, courts should use *Sahara*-style postponement orders sparingly and only on real evidence of prejudice, rather than as a way of silencing complainants.
- Fourth, reputation law should be reformed so that criminal defamation does not become the first weapon against an accuser. Civil remedies and the defense of truth in public interest, which succeeded in Ramani’s case, are enough for most disputes.
Conclusion
The internet will continue to condemn people, and it must. The issue in law is whether an accusation initiates or terminates a process. When speech leads to a forum, it is open to correction and respects of the basic safety of the target, it is accountability and is protected by the Constitution. When it replaces a court with a crowd, publishes the person’s life for punishment, and provides no avenue for recourse once the facts become clear, it is vigilantism. The principles that can differentiate the two are already in our law. What our law lacks is platform responsibility in applying these principles, and institutional speed.
- digital vigilantism
- freedom of expression
- right to reputation
- Indian constitutional law
Cite this article
Aashita Sabikhi , 'The Court of Public Opinion: When Does Digital Accountability Become Digital Vigilantism?' (DraftLaw Research, 24 October 2026) <https://draftlawresearch.org/articles/the-court-of-public-opinion-when-does-digital-accountability-become-digital-vigilantism/>
Copyright remains with the authors unless stated otherwise.

